Finally the task is undoubtedly more complex

Skeptics have never stopped Carlos Ghosn to take risks. At the time of the entry of Renault Nissan capital more tender in 1999, felt that, instead of investing around EUR 4.5 billion, the French automaker would do better to "directly swing of gold from a helicopter at the bottom of the ocean". The most cruel argued that "when a donkey breed with a mule, it rarely gives birth to a race horse." Seven years later, the "alliance" Renault-Nissan is an undeniable success and lessons donors have swallowed their taunts. Even stronger, a part of the American automotive gotha who, at the end of the 20th century, scoffed this franco-Lebanese-Brazilian engineer dream now to see the manager, became the CEO of Renault as Nissan, fly to the rescue of General Motors (GM), a number a global automotive in full rout.

After "saving" Nissan, Carlos Ghosn would save GM by bringing Renault and Nissan in the American capital. The idea to see history repeat itself is attractive, but nevertheless misleading, because GM is not a Nissan bis. Like Nissan at the end of the 1990s, GM is now a constructor in loss of speed, with the rise of Toyota (that should he win this year's world number one Crown). But the analogy ends there. He suffers from various ailments, it has distinct advantages. It cannot be "rescued" by Renault by une simple duplication of the plan which had operated in Tokyo.

To avoid bankruptcy, Nissan was in need of a massive recapitalisation. To restore profits, Japanese was to drastically reduce the purchase price of its components and cutting in its fixed costs by closing five plants and pushing toward the 21,000 employees exit. To find the path of growth, the constructor should finally reinvest in new models and become more aggressive in the US, absolutely crucial market for him. This recipe, GM the knows and does require a person to apply. For years, the American manufacturer already gradually ceded its assets (of the Group of computer service EDS via DirecTV, the OEM Delphi to GMAC, its highly profitable subsidiary of credit). Side vehicles, the product certainly group no doubt too many models and especially not enough sedans and 4 4 responding to the expectations of customers, but its lines are complete and, with ten marks, his portfolio is widely stocked. Its risk-taking, on the other hand, are sufficient and, even if bankruptcy cannot be excluded, it does not facing group for many years. Lower costs, GM still closed three American plants last year and plans to close two more this year. End of June, American employees 35,000 even agreed departures early retirement plan. A Carlos Ghosn could undoubtedly contribute to accelerate cost reductions and cut in the bureaucracy of the seat, but the "cost-killer" would probably not miracle on the shores of Lake Michigan.

Disabled by complementary health and retirement programs to its employees, GM has any need of time. Cynics believe that the group must take the time that its older generations of employees die. Realists note that GM should especially gradually reduce the size of its industrial tool to make it more in line with its declining sales in its domestic market.

Not only the evils affecting GM have nothing comparable with those which undermined Nissan, but the context and relationships of force are also different. Despite the speech with the Renault-Nissan tandem as an "alliance", it is the French who took control of a group which it controls 44 of the capital. Despite participation Cross (Nissan holding 15 of Renault), the power is in Boulogne. A minority stake in GM decision will not give as much weight Renault and automotive alliances cemeteries are filled with such marriages without true master on board.

And, even if he had to take the GM managerial control, Carlos Ghosn, despite his talents, could not be cloned. The ex-PDG of Renault, Louis Schweitzer, said that, if it had not been his future successor on hand, he would have probably not invested in Nissan. Today, Carlos Ghosn, who chairs already Renault, Nissan and manages direct us operations of the Japanese manufacturer, would want too make if it involved on a daily basis at GM. In addition, its room for manoeuvre would be closer to Tokyo. Unions, policies, the financial community and the tireless American lawyers would probably less passive that were their Japanese counterparts to shock therapy imposed by samurai Ghosn. Finally, the task is undoubtedly more complex. Nissan has two brands (Nissan and Infiniti), GM has ten and almost as many networks of dealers!

The equation to solve is difficult but, if he manages to take the company operational control, while maintaining safe GM bankruptcy and was still in the possibility of drawing the benefits of a possible recovery of the American Builder, Carlos Ghosn would be wrong not to seek an alliance with GM. Nissan, whose market share could at best after many years of efforts of 6-10-12 of the U.S. market, indirectly dominates the first market in the world. The new trio would be the leader in the Chinese market and the complementarities in the segment of luxury and in all of Latin America are real. Most importantly, even if there is no true global platforms, the trio could depreciate faster in each region the launch of new models by sharing basic and parts. To succeed this new tour de force, "cost-killer" should however change costume to become a "conductor". Carlos Ghosn is not afraid to take risks, it is not some false potential notes that should scare him.