But these policies do not constitute a policy

Until the fall of the Berlin wall and its logical consequence the reunification of the Germany, the France saw the construction of Europe the continuation of its policy by other means. More Europe means more France. If Europe was to France a "weapon of continuity", it was for the Germany to Chancellor Kohl a "guarantee of failure" to its nazi past. More Europe meant less nationalist temptation in Germany. Despite or perhaps this constitutive ambiguity, the Franco-German couple was a marriage of convenience that worked together well.

With the passage of time and the coming to power in a Germany reunited generations who had not known war and the consequences of Nazi barbarism, the Germany has gradually become a "second France", a country prior to any concerned him also its national interests. Europe could survive in the long term to the existence of "two Frances" within

We are now in a new phase. The balance of imbalances that could exist until recently between the France and the Germany has disappeared. In the Europe of twenty-seven, weakened by the financial and economic crisis there are now more Germany and less than France. There is also less of Europe and, at the same time when the world entered the era of multipolarity.

While she took the head of the G20 with voluntarism and imagination, the France must be aware that without the existence of a credible and strong Europe, it will very quickly become "inaudible" in the world, whatever may be "invention" of his reform proposals. Europe is the foundation upon which relies and builds all its Member States, including our foreign policy.

The problem for the France is not whether if it "has always in the same division," the Germany, encouraged by it by an Anglo-Saxon press too pleased to note the contrast between the results of the two countries. The priority of the France should do everything to be a credible player in global Europe. This means above all keep alive the "European flame" in Germany.

"We will have the Germany of our merits," had said one of the fathers of the Franco-German reconciliation, Joseph Rovan, right out of the death camps where he was as resistant. This was yesterday for him as the founding fathers of Europe, to transcend the past pourconstruire the future. It today instead of relying on the recent past of Europe to cope with the challenges of the present and thus saving the euro to save Europe. "Keep the Germany European" is at least as important to the France that "keeping nuclear Britain" which was one of the objectives stated security signed recently between London and Paris Treaty. But what cards can use the France to convince the Germany to remain in the euro area and the prevalence of European responsibilities over all other considerations The France can double in the debate which currently shakes the Germany: the firmness and clarity of European commitment, but by the seriousness and credibility of its economic and social policy.

Assist in maintaining the "European" Germany is in fact not only the priority of priorities for the foreign policy of the France, but the condition of the credibility of our other international actions. It is certainly possible to pretend to take advantage of this game to the piecemeal; for example selling weapons sophisticated to the Russia and in housing to behind Medvedev more unsavoury bet against Putin. Can be individualistic way on emerging countries, India, Brazil, China. But these policies do not constitute a policy. They do not reflect a strategic long-term vision for a European continent soon do more represent only 6 of the world's population.

Germany, there is not in Europe and without Europe, the France is alone well.